can assume the charge of any state government if they receive a receipt of failure of state constitutional machinery from the Governor or Ruler of the State. The President can also make a declaration empowering the Parliament to exercise the powers of the State Legislature. However, the President, according to a proviso of clause 1, cannot take over the High Court. The proclamation can be revoked or changed by a subsequent proclamation. The article also states that the proclamation should be presented before both the Houses of Parliament, and all the proclamations except that of revocation of the President’s Rule would expire after 6 months. However, Parliament holds the power to review and extend the proclamation for 12 months, but not more than 3 years in any case. All the laws made by parliament would cease to exist after a period of 1 year of revocation of the proclamation. 

The debate regarding this article started with B.R. Ambedkar moving some amendments. In the Draft Constitution of 1948, the governor held the power to assume state machinery through Article 188. However, Article 188 was proposed for deletion, and Dr Ambedkar moved the amendment, which would empower the President to take control of the state machinery on the recommendation of the Governor. Thus, the governor’s power to hold executive powers for 2 weeks was abolished. Additionally, the word ‘otherwise' was added to the first clause, giving the President autonomy to suspend the State Legislature without the governor’s receipt. The expiration time of the proclamation was also proposed to be reduced from 6 to 2 months. In the original Draft Article 278, the Parliament had the power to take over the functions of the State Legislature. A new amendment proposed that Parliament can delegate this authority to anyone, as the work might overburden the Parliament. The Proclamation, rather than getting extended to 12 months by Parliament directly, should be reviewed every 6 months till the maximum limit of 3 years. 

A new article 278A was introduced, which was a division of Article 278. This explained the details of the power which could be exercised by Parliament or the President when the article is enacted. Other than the provision of delegating power to any authority by the Parliament, the President could sanction the Budget from the Consolidated funds of India when the House of People (Lok Sabha) is not functioning. Other than these amendments, a member proposed to substitute the Ruler of the state in clause 1 with Rajpramukh. 

Various members showed their apprehension about the word “otherwise” in clause 1. A member argued that making the President powerful to this extent compromises provincial autonomy. He called the whole process constitutionally criminal in nature. Another member stated that such a kind of arbitrary power in the disposal of the President can result in dictatorial tendencies and states losing their autonomy to the Union. The member also highlighted that the present article resembles Article 93 of the Government of India Act 1935. In that, too, article 93 is omitted, and thus, the member said that rather than being progressive, the article is regressive in nature. Members were also opposed to the amendment, which no longer made the Governor hold executive power for a fortnight. This was seen by many as a danger to the Federal system. 

As this Article had concurrence with Section 93 of the Government of India Act (1935), there was considerable opposition to it due to the colonial experience, where the Governor-General held arbitrary power and used it against the provincial government. The framers, however, thought that such a provision was necessary to uphold a federal structure in the Indian context, where the Centre played a vital role in holding up the state. During the post-independence period, when the article was being discussed in the Assembly, the Indian landscape was marked by various princely states. Thus, the framers found this article important for the formation of a unified nation. However, at the same time, they were aware of its controversial nature and had agreed that it might be used for political manoeuvres. But still, the Article was adopted. This reflects the tumultuous nature of the Constitution at the time of its making. B.R. Ambedkar was himself anxious about the role of this article. In his speech on the discussion of this article, he called it a dead letter, asserting that such articles should not be called into operation and are in the Constitution for precautionary purposes. 

The article was passed by the Constituent Assembly by adopting the amendments proposed by the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, and the rest were negatived. However, in the Draft Constitution of 1949, the word “Ruler” was substituted with “Rajpramukh”. The article was renumbered as Article 356. 

Ambedkar’s anxiety, however, became reality and rather than just being a dead letter, the Article is politically misused. During the emergency period, through the 42nd Amendment, some crucial changes were made to this article. The period of President’s Rule after Parliament’s approval through this amendment was extended to 1 year from six months. The 44th Amendment reversed it and made the period 6 months again. Continuation of President’s Rule would require a fresh approval every six months. The 44th Amendment also introduces a new clause 5 in Article 356. Clause number 5 states that the President’s Rule cannot exceed a period of 1 year. It can only be extended if a National Emergency is declared in the nation or the Election Commission certifies that the continuance is necessary for holding elections in the concerned state. Even with these conditions, the maximum period of President’s Rule is 3 years. The period, however, can be extended through a constitutional amendment; it was done in the case of Punjab in the 1980s. Due to the prevailing insurgency in the state through the 67th and 68th Constitutional Amendments, the period of President’s Rule was extended first to 4 years and then to 5 years. Thus, the use of the Article was made much more stringent to be a safety valve rather than a political dagger. 

To avoid the political misuse of this Article, some other crucial steps were also taken. Two significant Commissions were the Sarkaria Commission (1983-88) and the Punchhi Commission (2007-10). The Sarkaria Commission, headed by Justice Ranjit Singh Sarkaria, was made to address the growing friction between the Centre and the States. The Commission, in its findings, recommended that Article 356 should be used in the rarest of the rare cases. Before its invocation, the President should give a written warning to the state government. Also, the report of the Governor should clearly specify the facts and justification for calling for President’s Rule. The Commission also recommended that the State Assembly should not be dissolved until the proclamation of the emergency has received Parliamentary approval. In its findings, it also made some recommendations regarding the appointment of the Governor. It is recommended that the person being appointed as Governor should not be politically active in the recent past and should be appointed with the consultation of the Chief Minister of the State. 

Punchhi Commission (2007-10), headed by retired CJI M.M. Punchhi, also looked into the Centre-State relation. It is recommended that Article 356 be amended in a way that, rather than declaring an emergency in a complete state, the Centre should impose the emergency in the troubled areas only. Additionally, regarding the appointment of the Governor, the Commission also provided some crucial recommendations. The person being appointed should not have been part of active politics for two years before the appointment. It is recommended that the tenure of the Governor should be fixed for 5 years and shall be removed only via resolution by the State Legislature.

Various judicial cases invoked Article 356, resulting in interpretations of the scope of this Article. In Rajasthan versus Union of India (1977), the petitioner challenged a notice sent by the Home Minister of India, which advised them to dissolve the State Legislature and seek a fresh mandate. The notice came after the Emergency, and the Janata Party formed a coalition government in the Centre. All such notices were sent to Congress-ruled States. If not dissolved, the Union Government would invoke Article 356 and impose President’s Rule. State of Rajasthan challenged this, arguing that the notice is unconstitutional. The key issue before the Court was whether it holds the power of judicial review of the President’s Rule imposed in a state. The Court held that Article 356 cannot be reviewed by the judiciary and that the President’s Rule depends on the President’s satisfaction to impose it. Thus, it cannot be objectively scrutinised. 

This decision, however, was overturned in the judgment delivered on S.R. Bommai versus Union of India (1994). In the present case, the petitioner, who was the Chief Minister of Karnataka, challenged the imposition of President’s Rule, arguing that the invocation of Article 356 is not done on justifiable grounds. The Court, in its decision, held that Article 356 is subject to judicial review. It also held that Article 356 should be invoked on justifiable grounds. Also, the floor test should be the grounds on which the majority should be checked, rather than on the subjective opinion of the Governor. It also held that the judiciary can reinstate the Government if it finds the use of Article 356 unconstitutional. 

S.R. Bommai versus Union of India became a landmark case, which was also reiterated in Rameshwar Prasad versus Union of India (2006). In this case, the Governor of Bihar recommended that the President invoke Article 356, arguing that after the Legislative Election, a coalition government was being formed through horse trading, as none of the parties had a clean majority. The Court held that the Governor cannot intervene in the formation of Government and prevent the formation of an alliance. Thus, Article 356 was invalidated in this case. 

The other significant case was Nabam Rebia versus Deputy Speaker (2016). In 2015, a political crisis emerged in Arunachal Pradesh, where the Congress party was leading the Government with 47 MLAs out of the total house strength of 60. However, 21 of these MLAs rebelled against the Government, with opposition MLAs supporting them. These MLAs demanded the removal of Nabam Tuki (CM) and Nabam Rebia  (Speaker). Following this, the Speaker disqualified these 14 MLAs. The decision was quashed by the Deputy Speaker on the same day, and the Governor continued the assembly session the next day. The Speaker and CM were removed from their posts, and a new CM was appointed. The Guwahati High Court held that the decision of the  Governor to continue with the session of the Assembly is totally constitutional and within the law. After this, Speaker Nabam Rebia moved to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Governor’s interference in the activities of the Legislature is unconstitutional. The court held that the decision made by the Governor is not within the law and reinforced the S.R. Bommai ruling, which stated that the Governor cannot act on their own direction. The case is important because it was the first time in Indian history that a Government was restored by the Supreme Court.